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THE SOCIAL INTEREST IN THE AESTHETIC AND THE SOCIALIZAON
OF THE LAW.--How far, if at all, should the law secure the interest
of society in esthetic surroundings? For example, how far, if at
all, should the law uphold legislation, including ordinances, de-
signed to beautify communities by establishing esthetic building
lines, prohibiting unsightly advertisement signs, preventing the
erection of other than private residences in residential districts
or the erection of hideous private residences? Until recently it
was universally held that, under the police power at any rate, an
owner of property could not lawfully be restrained from making
an anti-esthetic use of his property when the only objection was
that such use merely injured the esthetic sensibilities of his neigh-
bors." And some courts, including the West Virginia court, still
so hold.
2
1 City of Passaic v. Patterson Bill Posting etc. Co., 72 N. J. L. 285, 62 AtI. 267
(1905) in which Mr. Justice Swayze. says: "No case has been cited nor are 'we
aware of any case which holds that a man may be deprived of his property because
his tastes are not those of his neighbors. Aesthetic considerations are a matter of
luxury and indulgence rather than of necessity and it is necessity alone which justi-
fies the exercise of the police power to take private property without compensation."
3 Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S. V. 105 (1915) ; State v. Stahl-
man, 81 W. Va. 335, 94 S. E. 497 (1917). But see authorities cited in notes 13,
14 and 15.
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But shouldn't the owner of property be restrained under the
police power, from malting an unreasonably anti-testhetic use of
his property? Does the so-called absolute owner of property,
and no other, have a legally recognized interest in the use of the
property? Or is the property, though owned in fee simple by an
individual, in a sense also a sort of asset of society-a social institu-
tion with a social function to perform3 so that the owner may
not lawfully make an anti-social, e. g., an anti-esthetic, use of his
property?4 Just as the so-called absolute owner, because of the
interest of society in the use of his property, cannot, according
to the modern and better view, make an anti-social use of his
property by erecting a high fence simply to spite his neighbors,5
so doesn't the interest of society in the use of property justify the
prevention of an unreasonably anti-,esthetic and therefore anti-
social use of property?
The subject matter that law deals with is interests, that is,
human wants, claims, desires.6 These interests are either indi-
vidual interests, i. e., interests of individuals, or public interests,
i. e., interests of the state as a juristic person or as guardian of
social interests, or social interests, i. e., interests of society.7 The
owner of the property has a want or interest in using his property
for anti-fsthetic purposes--an individual interest. Society has a
want or interest in having property in its midst so used as not to
prevent society or individual members thereof from living a
proper life-a social interest. The state as guardian of social in-
terests has an interest of the same sort as the last-in form a pub-
lic interest but in substance a social interest. Now, here as else-
where in the law, it is not possible for the law to secure or satisfy
all wants or interests since some of them conflict. Therefore the
end of law today is to secure or satisfy as many of these wants
or interests as possible and sacrifice as few as possible and in so
doing to secure the more important interests and sacrifice the less
3 See CARDozO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 87 (1921): "Men are
saying today that property, like every other social institution has a social function to
fulfill." POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAv, 233, 234 (1922):
"Social-utilitarian theories explain and justify property as an institution which
secures a maximum of interests or satisfies a maximum of wants."
4 See Pound, A Theory of Social Interests, 15 Pulications of the American Socio-
logical Society 16, 40 (1920); POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, 185, 186
(1921).
Barger v. Barringer, 151 N. C. 433, 66 S. E. 439 (1909); See POUND, THE
SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW, 185, 186, 196, 197. But see contra Koblegard v. Hale,
60 W. Va. 37. 53 S. E. 793 (1906).
6 See POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMrON LAW, 91-93, 197-203; CARDOZO, Op. Cit.
112, 113.
See POUND, OUTLINE OF A COURSE ON THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COM-
MON LAW, 2, 3, 4 (1919).
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important." If we apply this method of reasoning, which of the
above mentioned interests with respect to the anti-esthetic use
of property should, upon a balancing of the conflicting interests,
be considered paramount and therefore be secured?
Until rather recently Anglo-American law ignored the purely
aesthetic sensibilities of society for the reason principally that
until rather recently the asthetic sensibilities of society, as such,
were not sufficiently acute to insist upon legal recognition. Thus,
a few years ago an eminent English jurist, comparing the French
and English in this respect, could appropriately quote :s
"Nature which gave them the goit
Only gave us the gout."
But with the advance of civilization, asthetic sensibilities of society
became more sensitive and unsightly surroundings may in a given
community cause as much general and genuine human unhappiness
as perturbing sounds,'0 or noisome smells 1 against which the law
gives protection under the police power. Therefore the opinion of
civilized society is beginning to preponderate, in some commun-
ities at any rate, in favor of reasonably securing the asthetic sen-
sibilities of society against anti-esthetic surroundings. Hence,
since "every opinion tends to become a law,"'"2 as Mr. Justice
Holmes so well says, the recent tendency is to secure the social
interest in esthetic surroundings by laws designed to beautify
communities," e. g., by laws establishing aesthetic building lines14
or exclusively residential sections.' 5 And the law should go still
s See Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Lagal Rules and Doctrines. 27
H1tv. L. REv. 195 (1914) ; Pound, The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought,
27 HArV. L. REV. 605, 30 HAav. L. RaV. 201.
9 Sir Frederick Pollock, 13 Lw QuA. REV. 337-338 (1897).
10 State v. White, 64 N. H. 48, 5 Atl 828 (1886) ; Ex parte Foote, 70 Ark. 12, 65
S. W. 706 (1901).
n The Manhattan Mfg. etc. Co. v. Van Keuren, 23 N. J. Eq. 251 (1872).
22 Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76 (1905).
13 See Pound, A Theory of Social Interests, supra. See Comments, 30 YALE L. J.
171, supporting this tendency as a proper exercise of the police power, citing cases.
But see, contra, arguing that this can be justified only under the power of eminent
domain by paying reasonable compensation, Notes, 34 HAv. L. REV. 419, citing
cases. In St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U. S. 269 (1919) the
court uses language somewhat in favor of an exercise of the police power for msthetic
purposes but there were also other than *esthetic purposes involved in the billboard
ordinance in question. But see Ayer v. Cram, 136 N. E. 338 (Mass. 1922) where
in dealing with a municipal commission's order as to the height of buildings the
court said: "Aesthetic considerations alone cannot justly form the basis for the exer-
cise of police power to limit the use of private property, but they may be taken into
account as ancillary to some other main purpose within the appropriate sphere of the
police power." See also the authorities cited in notes 14 and 15.
14 See, c. g., Town of Windsor v. Whitndy, 111 AtI. 354 (Conn. 1920). See com-
ments, 30 YALE L. J. 131. But see contra, Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va.
456, 84 S. E. 105 (1915).
5 Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E. 209 (1920)
City of Des Moines v. Manhattan Oil Co.. 184 N. W. 823 (Ia. 1921). See also State
v. Houghton, 176 N. W. 159 (Minn. 1920), an eminent domain case. But see contra
Spann v. City of Dallas, 235 S. W. 513 (Tex. 1921) ; See also City of Dallas v.
Mitchell, 245 S. W. 944 (Tex. CIv. App. 1922) ; Of. Ayer v. Cram, 136 N. E. 338
(Mass. 1922).
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farther in this direction. We are beginning to realize that the
central unit of civilization is not the individual but society8 and
that therefore social interests are more important than individual
interests. Hence, where the two interests conflict, since both can
not be secured, the tendency is to sacrifice the individual interest
so far as it is necessary in order to secure, to a reasonable extent,
the more important interests of society. This salutory change in
the law secures to the owner of property his reasonable wants
with respect to the use of his property-which is all that the owner
can reasonably ask-and secures to society its reasonable wants
with respect to esthetic surroundings, thus socializing the law by
reasonably securing the social interest in esthetic surroundings
and harmonizing the law with the preponderant settled opinion
of civilized society.
-T. P. H.
10 Of. Beale, The Development of Jurisprudence during the Nineteenth Century, 1
SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, 558, 561.
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